Infiltr8: The Red-Book
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On this page
  • Theory
  • Practice
  • Check if Company is Using Azure AD
  • Tenant Enumeration
  • Services Enumeration
  • User Enumeration
  • Resources

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  1. Cloud & CI/CD Pentesting
  2. Azure Pentesting
  3. Reconnaissance

Unauthenticated Reconnaissance

Last updated 1 month ago

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Theory

Unauthenticated reconnaissance is the first step in assessing an Azure AD environment. This phase involves gathering information about the target organization's Azure presence without requiring any authentication credentials. The goal is to identify valid domains, user accounts, and potential entry points that can be leveraged in subsequent phases of an engagement.

Practice

Check if Company is Using Azure AD

Before starting any Azure AD enumeration, it's important to verify if the target company is actually using Azure AD. This can be done through various methods.

If the NameSpaceType indicates "Managed", then the company is using Azure AD.

if the NameSpaceType indicates "Federated", then the company is using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) .

# Replace <DOMAIN> with the actual target FQDN
curl -s "https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=username@<DOMAIN>&json=1" | jq

Using (Powershell), If the Account Type indicates "Managed", then the company is using Azure AD.

Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName user@<DOMAIN>

Tenant Enumeration

Tenant enumeration involves gathering information about the Azure AD tenant configuration, including domain names, authentication methods, and tenant-specific details. This information can be obtained through various public APIs and tools.

TenantID

We can retreive the Tenant ID by quering the OpenID Configuration API endpoint

curl -s https://login.microsoftonline.com/ocd-testing.com/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq .token_endpoint

Domains

We can enumerate additional domains associated with the tenant using the Autodiscover service:

domain="example.com";curl -s https://autodiscover-s.outlook.com/autodiscover/autodiscover.svc -H "Content-Type: text/xml" -d @- << EOF |xq
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:exm="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages" xmlns:ext="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types" xmlns:a="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing" xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
  <soap:Header>
    <a:Action soap:mustUnderstand="1">http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/2010/Autodiscover/Autodiscover/GetFederationInformation</a:Action>
    <a:To soap:mustUnderstand="1">https://autodiscover-s.outlook.com/autodiscover/autodiscover.svc</a:To>
    <a:ReplyTo>
      <a:Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</a:Address>
    </a:ReplyTo>
  </soap:Header>
  <soap:Body>
    <GetFederationInformationRequestMessage xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/2010/Autodiscover">
      <Request>
        <Domain>$domain</Domain>
      </Request>
    </GetFederationInformationRequestMessage>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
EOF

All-In-One

Invoke-AADIntReconAsOutsider -DomainName company.com | Format-Table

TenantID

Get-AADIntTenantID -Domain <DOMAIN>

Domains

Get-AADIntTenantDomains -Domain <DOMAIN>

Services Enumeration

Organizations often use various Azure services that can be discovered through DNS enumeration or by checking common Azure subdomains.

Enumerate Azure SubDomains
# This script takes a base word and a list of permutations and enumerates several Azure services for potential targets.

# Base: The base word to use
# Permutations: A path to a permutation wordlist
Invoke-EnumerateAzureSubDomains -Base company -Permutations ".\permutations.txt" -Verbose 
python cloud_enum.py -k target.com --disable-aws --disable-gcp
Enumerate Azure Storage Accounts & Blobs

Open Storage

Anonymous read access may be enabled by a public access policies for blobs. Furthermore, storage resources follow predictable URL patterns at core.windows.net:

  • storage-account-name.blob.core.windows.net

  • storage-account-name.file.core.windows.net

  • storage-account-name.table.core.windows.net

  • storage-account-name.queue.core.windows.net

# This script takes a base word and prefixes/suffixes it with a list of words to identify any storage blobs associated with a target. 
# It will also attempt to enumerate any containers in the blob.

## Base: The base word to use
## OutputFile: Where to save the results
## Permutations: A path to a permutation wordlist (default is Microburst/Misc/permutations.txt)
Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base company -Permutations ".\permutations.txt" -OutputFile azureblobs.txt

SAS URLs

A shared access signature (SAS) URL is an URL that provides access to certain part of a Storage account (could be a full container, a file...) with some specific permissions (read, write...) over the resources. If you find one leaked you could be able to access sensitive information, they look like this (this is to access a container, if it was just granting access to a file the path of the URL will also contain that file):

https://<storage_account_name>.blob.core.windows.net/newcontainer?sp=r&st=2021-09-26T18:15:21Z&se=2021-10-27T02:14:21Z&spr=https&sv=2021-07-08&sr=c&sig=7S%2BZySOgy4aA3Dk0V1cJyTSIf1cW%2Fu3WFkhHV32%2B4PE%3D

Enumerate Azure Container Registry (ACR)

By default, access to pull or push images from an Azure Container Registry is only available to authenticated users. But it's possible to allow anonymous pull access.

Authorizing anonymous pulls can be done as follows (need permissions)

az acr update --name <registry-name> --anonymous-pull-enabled true

If we know such registry name and images, we can pull it as follows

docker pull myregistry.azurecr.io/myimage:latest

User Enumeration

The GetCredentialType API can be used for username enumeration.

# Return values:
#0 The account exists, and uses that domain for authentication
#1 The account doesnโ€™t exist
#2 The response is being throttled
#4 Some server error
#5 The account exists, but is set up to authenticate with a different identity provider. This could indicate the account is only used as a personal account
#6 The account exists, and is set up to use both the domain and a different identity provider
curl -s -X POST https:///login.microsoftonline.com/common/GetCredentialType --data '{"Username":"user1@example.com"}' | jq '.IfExistsResult'

The onedrive module relies on the target user(s) having previously logged into OneDrive. If a valid user has not yet used OneDrive, their account will show as 'invalid'.

# --enum-module: enum module (autologon, oauth2, office, onedrive, rst)
# --domain: target domain
# --enum: user enum mode
python o365spray --enum -U usernames.txt --domain <TARGET.COM> --enum-module rst
# Test a single email address
o365creeper.py -e test@example.com

# Test a list of email addresses
o365creeper.py -f potential-emails.txt

# Test a list of email addresses and save to file
o365creeper.py -f potential-emails.txt -o valid-emails.txt
# -t: tenant name
# -d: target domain name (required)
# -U: file containing usernames (wordlists)
# -u: single user to target
python onedrive_enum.py -t microsoft -d microsoft.com -U potential-users.txt
# Using a single email address
Invoke-AADIntUserEnumerationAsOutsider -UserName "user@company.com"

# Using a list of email addresses
Get-Content .\potential-emails.txt | Invoke-AADIntUserEnumerationAsOutsider

Resources

We can query all the information of an Azure tenant with just one command from (Powershell).

We can retreive the Tenant ID using (Powershell).

We can enumerate additional domains using (Powershell).

It's possible to try to find Azure services exposed in common azure subdomains like the ones documented in this .

(Powershell) can be used to achieve that goal, and enumerate Azure Subdomains.

The same can be acheive using (python)

are Microsoft's cloud storage solution, similar to Amazon S3. It includes several services like the , for unstructured data (images, videos, and documents..).

(Powershell) can then be used to brute-force storage account names, containers, and files (blobs):

Use to access the data

The goal is to, aiming to identify valid accounts using tools and techniques below.

Ensure that the domain is managed () to guarantee accurate results when using this technique. If it doesn't, unmanaged domains can return 0, leading to false positives

(python) is a username enumeration and password spraying tool aimed at Microsoft Office 365 (O365). It can be used to validate users trough various methods: autologon, oauth2, office, onedrive, rst

(Python) is a script that performs email address validation against Office 365 without submitting login attempts. It use the GetCredentialType API and check for the IfExistsResult field.

(Python) can be used to validate O365 users trough the OneDrive API.

We can check if a user exists in a tenant using (Powershell).

๐Ÿ› ๏ธ
AADInternals
AADInternals
AADInternals
AADInternals
post
MicroBurst
cloud_enum
Azure Storage Account
Blob storage
MicroBurst
Storage Explorer
compile a list of possible valid email addresses for the targeted company
o365spray
o365creeper
onedrive_user_enum
AADInternals
refer to this section
LogoCARTP-cheatsheet/recon.md at main ยท 0xJs/CARTP-cheatsheetGitHub
LogoAz - Unauthenticated Enum & Initial Entry - HackTricks Cloud