Rights on RODC object
With administrative control over the RODC computer object in the Active Directory, there is a path to fully compromise the domain. It is possible to modify the RODC’s msDS-NeverRevealGroup
and msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup
attributes to allow a Domain Admin to authenticate and dump his credentials via administrative access over the RODC host.
For more granularity, one of these ACEs against the RODC object is initially sufficient, since they will implicitly allow WriteProperty
against the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup
and msDS-NeverRevealGroup
attributes:
GenericWrite
GenericAll
/FullControl
WriteDacl
(the attacker can modify the DACL and obtain arbitrary permissions)Owns
(c.f.WriteDacl
)WriteOwner
(i.e. the attacker can obtainOwns
->WriteDacl
-> other permissions)WriteProperty
against themsDS-RevealOnDemandGroup
attribute in conjunction with another primitive to gain privileged access to the host.WriteProperty
against themsDS-NeverRevealGroup
attribute may be required if it includes the target account.
From UNIX-like systems, this PowerView python package (Python) can be used to modify the LDAP attribute.
Then, dump the krbtgt_XXXXX
key on the RODC server with admin access on the host (this can be done by modifying the managedBy
attribute for example), and use it to forge a RODC golden ticket and conduct a key list attack to retrieve the domain Administrator's password hash.
References
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